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liability to discharge the encumbrance upon it. To avoid this result
he radically alters the common law entireties estate by extending
survivorship to a debt which the entireties property secures, in order
to destroy a valid contract obligation. Both the means employed and
the end sought seem to be legally indefensible.
If it be thought that the result reached by the courts which deny
contribution-that is, that a deceased debtor be released from his liability to contribute merely because his spouse acquires title by survivorship to the land securing the debt-is an "equitable" result, its
advocates should resort to the legislatures and not to the courts.
JoSEPH L. LYLE, JR.

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE
POLICE PROTECTION
The many authorities advocating reform in the area of municipal
tort liability will find little comfort in a recent four-to-three decision
by the Court of Appeals of New York. For many years criticism has
been heaped upon the doctrine of municipal immunity from tort
liability,' and New York received wide praise as the first state to
abolish this doctrine. 2 However, with this abolition, the legislature
of New York did not intend to impose an absolute liability on the
municipality as an insurer, and it was felt that certain limitations
were required to balance the conflict between private and public
interests. Through a process of inverse reasoning,3 the Court of Appeals, in the case of Schuster v. City of New York, 4 appears to have
"There is extensive literature dealing with this problem of municipal tort immunity, and particular attention is called to the following: Borchard, Government
Liability in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-25); 36 Yale L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (192627); 28 Colum. L. Rev. 577, 734 (1928); Fuller and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability
in Operation, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (1941); Green, Municipal Liability for Torts, 38
Ill. L. Rev. 355 (1944); Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations, 4 Ill.
L.Q. 28 (1921); Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental
or Proprietary Test, 22 Va. L. Rev. 9io (1936); Tooke, The Extension of Municipal
Liability in Tort, 19 Va. L. Rev. 97 (1932).
2Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1363, 1391
(1954)3The reasoning of the court was inverse in the sense that the question of
liability appears to have been decided first, and then the reasoning was molded so
as to support this decision. The killing of Arnold Schuster aroused great public
sentiment, and it is quite possible that this, in addition to the extreme circumstances surrounding this case, was influential in causing the Court of Appeals to
lay down too broad a rule.
415N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958).
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imposed such an absolute liability upon the defendant City by holding
it liable to the estate of a murdered informer for alleged negligence in
failing to provide him with proper police protection, after he had received threats and had requested protection.
This action was instituted by plaintiff as administrator of the estate
of his deceased son, Arnold L. Schuster, to recover damages from the
City for the son's wrongful death. Young Schuster recognized Willie
Sutton, the notorious criminal, and furnished the New York City
Police Department with information that led to Sutton's arrest.
Schuster's part in the apprehension of Sutton was acknowledged by
the police and received wide publicity. Shortly thereafter, the deceased
received threatening phone calls and letters, and he was furnished
limited and partial police protection at his home and place of business. At a later date, after assuring Schuster that he was in no danger,
the police department removed this protection. On the evening of
March 8, 1952, approximately three weeks after his identification of
Sutton, Schuster was shot and killed while walking on the street.5
The trial court dismissed the suit for failure to state a cause of
action, 6 and on appeal the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
affirmed per curiam.7 The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
the complaint did state a cause of action against the City. 8
A decision such as this would be inconceivable under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, accepted and followed by the overwhelming
majority of state courts. The source of the doctrine was the English
theory that "the King can do no wrong," 9 and under its original application, the sovereign, be it national, state, or local, was completely
immune from all tort liability. 10 Because of the injustice that this
application worked upon the individual, and in an effort to balance
'For a more detailed report of the slaying, see New York Times, March 9, 1953,
p. I, col. 8.
"Schuster v. City of New York, 207 Misc. 2d 1102, 121 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Sup. Ct.
1953).

7The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court held that there was no duty
on the City of New York to protect Arnold Schuster, and even if such a duty did
exist, the complaint failed to show that the violation of the duty was the proximate
cause of Schuster's death. Schuster v. City of New York, 286 App. Div. 389, 143
N.Y.S.2d 778 (2d Dep't 1955).

'See note 4 supra.
t'The ancient English maxim that "The King can do no wrong" was translated
into the legal concept that the sovereign could not be sued without its consent.
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 36 Yale L.J. 1, 17 (1926).
2The immunity of the state was extended to the municipality as a subdivision
of the state. Russell v. Men of Devon, Willes 74, ioo Eng. Rep. 359 (K.B. 1788).
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public and private interests, 1 the functions of the sovereign were
2
The sovereign
split into two classes: governmental and proprietary.1
was liable for torts of commission and omission resulting from the
performance of a proprietary function, but was immune from liability for torts of commission and omission resulting from the performance of a governmental function.'3 However, due to continued
ambiguity and uncertainty, the latter immunity was further refined,
and the liability of the sovereign was extended to torts of commission
resulting from the performance of a governmental function.' 4 The
immunity in respect to torts of omission resulting from the nonperformance of governmental functions was continued. 5 This was the
general situation in New York in 1929, when section 12a (now section
8) of the Court of Claims Act was enacted. 16 This waived the State's
immunity from tort liability and established that the liability of the
State was to be determined by the same rules of law applicable to
individuals and corporations. The immunity of the municipalities of
New York remained unaffected by this waiver until the decision in
Bernardinev. City of New York in 1945,17 when the Court of Appeals
held that since the immunity of the municipality was merely an exten""Every thoughtful consideration of the problem of municipal liability in modem times has inevitably faced two conflicting propositions: (1) the widespread fear
that a rule of liability would impose an unbearable financial burden upon municipal
corporations, and thus upon the public, has been opposed to (2) the manifest unfairness of a rule of non-liability to the injured individual, and the social desirability
of spreading the risk of loss." Lloyd, Municipal Tort Liability in New York, 23
N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 278, 291 (1948).
"'Bailey v. City of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. 1842).
218 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations §§ 53.02, 53.23, 53.24 (3d ed. 1950).
"Lubelfeld v. City of New York, 4 N.Y.2d 455, 151 N.E.2d 862 (1958); Flamer
v. City of Yonkers, 3og N.Y. 114, 127 N.E.2d 838 (1955); Wilkes v. City of New York,
308 N.Y. 726, 124 N.E.2d 338 (1955); Bloom v. Jewish Bd. of Guardians, 286 N.Y.
349, 36 N.E.2d 617 (1941); Miller v. City of New York, 266 App. Div. 565, 43
N.Y.S.2d 79 (1st Dep't 1943).
"Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945); Springfield Fire and
Marine Ins. Co. v. Village of Keeseville, 148 N.Y. 46, 42 N.E. 405 (1895); Murrain
v. Wilson Line, 270 App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1st Dep't 1946); Ferrier v.
City of White Plains, 262 App. Div. 94, 28 N.Y.S.2d 218 (2d Dep't 1941); Landby
v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 199 Misc. 73, 1o5 N.Y.S.2d 836 (Sup. Ct. 1950);
Finkelstein v. City of New York, 182 Misc. 271, 47 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
"N.Y. Laws 1929, ch. 467. This was amended by N.Y. Ct. Cl. Act § 8,
which provides as follows: "The state hereby waives its immunity from liability
and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have same determined in
accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court
against individuals or corporations .... "
7294
N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 6o4 (1945). This action was brought against the City
under § 5o-b of the General Municipal Law which imposed liability for the negligence of employees in the operation of municipally-owned vehicles or facilities of
transportation.
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sion of the immunity of the State, the waiver by the State of its immunity necessarily resulted in a waiver of the municipality's immunity.'5
With the waiver of its own immunity, as well as that of its municipalities, New York became the most liberal state in the United States in regard to the question of municipal tort liability. 19
As liberal as it is, New York has nevertheless felt constrained to
place some limitations upon this liability, to avoid making insurers
of the municipalities-a position that would threaten their financial
stability. Even though the immunity of the municipalities has been
waived, the general classification of the functions of the municipality
as governmental and proprietary has in effect been retained, and has
served as a basis for determining liability since the decision in Bernardine.20 Without question, the municipalities are liable for torts of
commission or omission resulting from the performance of a proprietaiy function.2 ' They are also liable for torts of commission resulting
from the performance of governmental functions. 22 The problem arises,
as it did in Schuster, when the courts attempt to deal with the question
of liability for torts of omission resulting from the nonperformance of
a governmental function. When there is no statutory duty, as under
a permissive statute, no liability is imposed.2 3 Where there is a statutory duty, as under a mandatory statute, liability is imposed when
the duty runs to the individual, and is not imposed when it does not. 24
11 Id. at 605. See also McCarthy v. Saratoga Springs, 269 App. Div. 469, 56
N.Y.S.2d 6oo (3d Dep't 1945); Young v. Village of Potsdam, 269 App. Div. 918, 58
N.Y.S.2d 102 (3d Dep't 1945); Holmes v. Erie County, 266 App. Div. 220, 42 N.Y.S.2d
243 (4th Dep't 1943).
2'Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1363,
1391 (1954). This article, which contains a state by state summary of municipal
tort liability, is highly recommended. For a discussion of the liability of the federal
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, see Gellhorn and Lauer, Federal
Liability for Personal and Property Damage, 29 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1325 (1954).
O"Lloyd, Municipal Tort Liability in New York, 23 N.Y.L.Q. Rev. 278, 286
(1948). In his sequel to this article, Mr. Lloyd suggests that the court was wholly
justified in recasting this distinction. Lloyd, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roil,"
24 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 38, 43 (1949)"1Murrain v. Wilson Line, 27o App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S.2d 750, 753 (ist Dep't
1946).
21
Ibid. Accord, Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E.2d 604
(1945); Miller v. City of New York, 266 App. Div. 565, 43 N.Y.S.2d 79 (ist Dep't
1943); Holmes v. Erie County, 266 App. Div. 220, 42 N.Y.S.2d 243 (4th Dep't 1943).
See also note 14 supra.
2
1"Failure to act, where there is no mandatory duty ... is no ground of recovery
against a municipality." 18 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 53.08 ( 3 d ed. 1950).
See also Lloyd, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roil," 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 38, 44 (1949).
21
"The violation of such a duty, resulting in damage, gives rise to an action
in tort, if, but only if, the intent of the statutory enactment is to protect an in-
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Such was the state of law in New York at the time the Schuster case
came before the Court of Appeals. Since police protection is historically a governmental function,25 and since this was dearly a case of
omission, in order to impose liability upon the City, the court had to
find, first, a duty, and second, a duty to the plaintiff. In an attempt
to satisfy this requirement, the majority sought to establish a duty
in three ways: (1) as a reciprocal duty, (2) as a statutory duty, and
(3) as an assumed duty.
I.

RECIPROCAL

DuTy

In an effort to justify its imposition of liability upon the defendant, the Court of Appeals first sought to establish a duty on the
part of Schuster to inform, which in turn involved a reciprocal duty
on the part of the defendant to protect Schuster once he had informed.
The basis of Schuster's duty lies in the common law, according to
the majority, and it is quite true that the early common law of Eng26
land did require the private citizen to inform as to any known felony.
Failure to do this constituted the crime of misprision of a felony, but,
as Judge Stephen pointed out,27 this crime was almost obsolete three-

quarters of a century ago, and with rare exceptions has not been recognized in this country. The rare exception will not be found in New
York, as the common law crime of misprision of a felony is not a part
of the penal law of New York.28 Thus falls the major premise of the
majority: that Schuster's legal duty to inform begets a reciprocal
legal duty on the City to protect him once he has informed.
Even if the New York penal law did provide for the common law
crime of misprision of a felony, it is extremely doubtful under the
present circumstances whether Schuster would be guilty of a violation
of it if he failed to inform, and thus he would be under no legal duty
to inform. The federal statute dealing with misprision of a felony provides for a penalty when a private citizen "conceals and does not ...
dividual against invasion of a property or personal interest." Steitz v. City of Beacon,
295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704, 7o6 (1945).
Z18 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 53.51 (3 d ed. 195o).
2Commonwealth v. Lopes, 318 Mass. 453, 61 N.E.2d 849, 850 (1945).
2 Stephen, History of the Criminal Law of England 238 (1883).
2"54 N.E.2d at 544. An extensive search of the New York statutes has failed
to bring to light any provision dealing with misprision of a felony. Rather than
place the private citizen under a duty to inform, and make his failure to inform
a crime, the modern method of handling this problem is to create an incentive,
in the form of a rewvard, which will induce the private citizen to aid in law enforcement.
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make known" a felony.2 9 "Under it some affirmative act toward the
concealment of the felony is necessary. Mere silence after knowledge of
the commission of the crime is not sufficient." 30 In the light of this
interpretation, even if the New York penal law did contain a provision
similar to the federal statute, Schuster would be under a legal duty
not to take any affirmative act toward concealment of the whereabouts
of Sutton, but he would be under no legal duty to inform the police
as to the whereabouts of Sutton. Judge Van Voorhis, in the majority
opinion, states that it matters little whether Schuster's duty was legal
or moral. 31 This appears to be an ill-considered statement. It is conceded that Schuster was under a moral duty to aid the police, but if his
was a moral duty, so was the reciprocal duty of the police. It is inconceivable that a moral duty to inform would beget a reciprocal
legal duty to protect.
II. STATUTORY DuTY

Apparently recognizing that an extremely tenuous argument supporting a duty to protect had been propounded, the majority attempted to strengthen its position by asserting the existence of a
statutory duty. Section 435 of the New York City Charter states that
"the police department and force shall have the power and it shall be
their duty to preserve the public peace, prevent crime ... protect the
rights of persons and property, guard the public health ...remove all
nuisances on the public streets ... enforce and prevent the violation
of all laws ... and for these purposes to arrest all persons guilty of
violating any law or ordinance...." 3 2 Clearly this statute envisions a
broad duty to protect the general public from crime, and such an
enactment does not import an intention "to protect the interests of
any individual except as they secure to all members of the community
the enjoyments of rights and privileges to which they are entitled
only as members of the public. Neglect in the performance of such
requirements creates no civil liability to individuals."3 3 Having found
a broad duty to the general public, the majority then sought to establish that this duty ran to the individual. Section 1848 of the Penal
Wx8 U.S.C. § 4 (1952).
v. United States, 73 F.2d 795, 798 (ioth Cir. 1934). See also Neal v.
United States, io2 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1939).
' 154 N.E.Z2d at 538.
2As quoted in 154 N.E.2d at 543.
=Murrain v. Wilson Line, 27 o App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S.2d 750, 754 (ist Dep't
1946).
-Bratton
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Law34 imposes an absolute liability upon the City, causing the City
to respond in damages for the "personal injury or death of persons
injured or killed while aiding policemen at their direction in making
arrests."35 This statute is completely inapplicable here, but the majority asserts that it represents a general public policy in favor of the
municipality responding in damages to persons injured or killed while
aiding in law enforcement. 36
By enacting section 12a (now section 8) of the Court of Claims
Act, 37 a statute in derogation of the common law, the legislature

recognized that it had not effected any solution to the problem of
municipal tort liability, 38 and this section was followed by a series
of enactments specifically imposing liability upon the municipalities
in a number of the most common situations. 39 Section 1848 of the
Penal Law is an example of such a specific imposition, and by enacting this section, while refraining from enacting a provision covering
the situation in the principal case, the legislature exhibited the extent
to which it was willing to go. "An intention to impose upon the City
the crushing burden of such an obligation should not be imputed to
the Legislature in the absence of language clearly designed to have that
40
effect."
III. ASSUMED DUTY
Judge McNally, in his concurring opinion, supports the majority's
imposition of liability for the alleged negligent performance of a reciprocal duty and a statutory duty, and also advocates the additional
basis of an assumed duty. 41 "It is ancient learning that one who assumes to act, even though gratuitously, may thereby become subject
to the duty of acting carefully, if he acts at all." 42 This rule places the
-"N.Y. Pen. Laws § 1848.
s154 N.E.2d at 539.
'6The Court of Appeals cited § 1848 as a manifestation of a legislative policy
evincing "care and solicitude for the private citizen who co-operates with the public
authorities in the arrest and prosecution of criminals." 154 N.E.2d at 540.
3
See note 16 supra.
"'Lloyd, Municipal Tort Liability in New York, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rev. 278, 285
(1948).
39N.Y. Munic. Laws § 5o-a (liability for negligence in operation of municipallyowned vehicles); N.Y. Munic. Laws § 5o-b (liability for negligence in operation
of municipally-owned vehicle or other facility of transportation); N.Y. Munic.
Laws § 5o-c (liability for negligence of firemen and policemen in operation of any
vehicle); N.Y. Munic. Laws § 5o-d (liability for malpractice of physicians and
dentists employed in municipally-operated institutions); N.Y. County Laws § 6-b
(assumption of liability by county for torts of officers and employees).
"OSteitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704, 706 (1945).
41154 N.E.2d at 541.
"Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922).
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defendant under a duty not to injure or aggravate an existing injury
of the one to whom aid is offered. However, one who undertakes to
act is under no duty to act indefinitely. He may discontinue the services if he does not thereby leave the person in a worse position than
43
he was in when the services were begun.
It is quite true that the police undertook to give Schuster limited
and partial protection at his home and at his place of business, but he
was not taken into protective custody. When the police withdrew
its gratuitous special protection, Schuster was left in exactly the same
position he was in before the protection was undertaken. His condition was in no way aggravated or altered. In addition, Schuster was
killed while walking the streets of New York, and the police had never
undertaken to protect him in this area. Thus, even if the protection
had been continued, and the police department had been negligent
in the performance of this limited assumed duty, this would have no
relation to Schuster's death and would not serve as a basis for the
imposition of liability.
The majority lays great emphasis upon the statement that when
"inaction would commonly result, not negatively merely in withholding a benefit, but positively or actively in working an injury, there
exists a relation out of which arises a duty to go forward." 44 The validity of this statement is conceded, but can it be said that inaction in
failing to provide an informer with complete police protection commonly results in injury to or the death of the informer? When the
number of informers who are actually injured or killed is compared
with the total number of informers, it is submitted that it cannot be
said that injury or death of the informer is a common result of the
failure to provide police protection. Injury or death is the exception,
and no relation arises which creates a duty to go forward.
Thus it appears that the majority has failed to establish a valid
basis for imposing a legal duty on the defendant City to provide
police protection to persons in Schuster's situation. However, even
if it is assumed arguendo that such a duty does exist, and that the
duty does run to the individual, it is submitted that the complaint still
fails to state a cause of action. In order for tort liability to result,
there must be a duty, as well as a violation of this duty which was
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury or death 4 5 Judge Learned
"Restatement, Torts § 323 (1934).
4154 N.E.2d at 538, citing with approval Judge Cardozo's opinion in Moch Co.
v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. i6o, 159 N.E. 896 (1928). (Emphasis added.)
"Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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Hand propounded three widely accepted variables used in determining whether conduct has violated a duty. He said that the probability
that injury will result and the gravity if it does result must be balanced
46
against the burden of adequate precautions.
When the number of informers who are actually injured or killed
is considered, it becomes apparent that the probability that injury or
death will result is extremely low, while the gravity if injury or death
does result is high. On the other hand, the burden of adequate precaution is extremely large. In order to protect informers adequately, three
policemen would have to be assigned to the protection of each of
these informers. The cost of maintaining a police force of sufficient
size to meet this demand, in addition to the normal demands placed
upon it, would be prohibitive. It is submitted that even if a duty did
exist to provide police protection to informers, the discretionary
failure to provide this protection, or the discretionary removal of
partial protection already provided, should not constitute a violation
of this duty.
In asserting the existence of a duty to provide police protection to
persons in Schuster's situation, the majority is virtually imposing an absolute liability on the defendant. Hereafter, the police department acts
at its own peril in refusing to furnish such police protection, for even
if the protection is unnecessary in the opinion of the police department, a jury may find at a later date that the police were negligent
in failing to provide the protection. "Duties have their genesis in
concepts of reasonableness ....Reasonableness demands that the need
for special police protection be left to the absolute discretion of
the police department." 47 If the decision as to the need for special
police protection is not left to the discretion of the police department,
the effective functioning of this department will be greatly hindered.
"A mere mistake in judgment by the department should not be the
basis for the imposition of liability upon the municipality else...
the police department will find itself faced with the impossible task
of supplying all witnesses and all informers with special protection ....,,48
'6The duty "to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables:
(1) The probability ...(2) the gravity of the resulting injury... (3)the burden of

adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in
algebraic terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B;
liability depends upon whether B is less than ...PL." Chief Judge Learned Hand
in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
47154 N.E.2d at 545- (Emphasis added.)
48Ibid. Professor William Miller of New York University suggests "that even
under the complete waiver in New York there is still no liability where the officer

